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Let’s talk about antinomies
Normative systems reloaded
Alessio Sardo
 
1 Introduction
1  Carlos  E.  Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin’s  Normative  Systems (from now on ‘NS’) is
generally considered as one of the most groundbreaking books in legal theory, and as a
major  contribution  to  the  early  development  of  deontic  logic.  In  this  1970’s  classic,
Alchourrón and Bulygin built up a complex theory that can be used to analyze both ideal
and real law-application methods. The main intuition behind NS is that any legal, case-
solving process consists in establishing the deontic status of a certain action, which is
relative to a given universe of discourse (UD), according to the normative propositions that
describe the legal  system under consideration.  The inference from general  norms to
effective individual requirements does not presuppose any sort of volitional act.1 Each
ensemble  of  rough,  normative  materials  can  be,  in  principle,  reshaped  as  a  closed,
deductive system.2 Generally speaking, judges and other decision-makers, by dealing with
small portions of the whole system (i.e. micro-systems),  take part in the law-creation
process. When legislators (namely, empowered authorities)3 did not provide any clear
solution, judges must find the correct answer on their own. Any legal order, taken as a
whole, is a sequence of interlocking systems, connected by a specific, positivistic relation
of identity qua membership.4 
2  NS contains a formal language that can be used to represent legal and, more broadly,
normative reasoning. Roughly speaking, the meta-language of NS can be described as a
non-conservative  expansion  of  standard,  model-theoretic  first  order  logic,  which
includes: syntactic variables (x, y, z…) and constants (p, q, r…) for the individuals of the
object-language, variables for sets of individuals (α, β, γ…) monadic and dyadic sentential
connectives (biconditional ‘⇔’, conditional ‘⇒’, negation ‘¬’, conjunction ‘∧’), symbols for
the classes-calculus (inclusion ‘⊆’, membership ‘∈’…). These elements are combined with
deontic modalities (‘O’ obligatory, ‘P’ permitted, ‘Ph’ Prohibited) to generate well-formed
formulae.5 Norms  are  conceived  as  “hyletic”  proposition-like  entities,  structured  as
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conditional  statements.6 Deontic  modalities  are  embedded  in  the  consequent  of  the
conditional statement, whereas the antecedent contains a partial state description of an
action-type: a “generic case”, in NS-jargon. Using a well-established metaphor, we can say
that norms set up a “bridge” connection between (relevant) generic cases and deontic
modalities.7 Alchourrón and Bulygin designed their model under the influence of von
Wright, but relying, on the one hand, on a Tarskian8 approach in semantics and, on the
other,  on  a  Kelsenian9 conception  of  the  static/dynamic  structure  of  the  normative
dimension.
3  In this essay, I will not explore in details the core of Alchourrón and Bulygin’s book-wide
project, for it would be too ambitious. I will not even try to discuss the host of problems
raised by this approach, which have already been analyzed by Mauro Barberis (1997).10
The  aim  of  the  present  contribution  is  much  more  modest:  I  will  set  my  focus  to
normative conflicts. I would like to invite attention to this topic because, despite their
great  theoretical  importance,  normative  conflicts  seem  to  occupy  only  peripheral
positions in NS, and receive but a rushed overview. More specifically, as I will argue, NS
does  not  counter  the  challenge  raised  by  the  existence  of instantiation  conflicts,  which
represents a serious danger for NS, insofar as it supports the claim that some “special”
cases of  antinomy cannot be reduced to conflicts between generic cases.  NS,  instead,
assumes  that  every  antinomy,  by  definition,  is  a  conflict  between  general  cases:
accordingly,  every antinomy stems from an inconsistent deontic modalization of  two
identical or overlapping general cases. In my essay I will propose new arguments in favor
of  NS,  by showing how even paradigmatic  examples of instantiation conflicts  can be
reframed as  antinomies  between general  cases.  I  will  defend the  approach of  NS  as
follows: 
4  Right after providing a brief reconstruction of NS’s analysis of normative conflicts, I shall
introduce the notion of instantiation conflict.11 Then, I will show how authors such as
Riccardo Guastini,  Jorge Rodríguez,  Pablo Navarro and others rely on this  notion for
pointing  out  the  existence  of  a  “special”  category  of  normative  conflicts,  which are
necessarily bound to individual, actual cases and, therefore, fall out of the scope of NS-
model. Although these authors are very cautious in deriving dramatic implications from
their  argument,  I  will  maintain  that,  should  they  be  right,  several  fundamental
assumptions of NS might be seriously questioned. This list includes the claim that legal
systems  correspond  to  sets  of  abstract  entities,  closed  under  the  notion  of  logical
consequence,12 and that a sharp line separates norms from facts (a version of the well-
known “Hume’s guillotine”).
5  Next, in opposition to Rodríguez, Navarro and Guastini, I will argue that a reductionist
approach is feasible. As Giovanni Battista Ratti demonstrated a couple of years ago, there
are compelling reasons for denying that so-called conflicts of instantiation display special
logical properties, and that they necessarily arise from the facts of an actual, individual
case.  If  we  accept  antecedent  strengthening,  every  example  of  instantiation  conflict
proposed in the lively debate over antinomies can be effectively reframed as a conflict
between generic cases. I will then add some fuel to Ratti’s demonstration, by exploring
the idea of a conceptual connection between two apparently unrelated norms.13 
6  Finally, notwithstanding my objection, I will try to save one of the main intuitions that
inspired  the  instantiation  conflicts  argument.  Under  my  view,  this  argument,  albeit
incorrect, could be considered as an attempt to do justice to some reasonable intuition
about  our  perception of  normative  conflicts.  Those  cases  generally  regarded  as
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instantiation conflicts  do  not  display  any peculiar,  logical  structure,  or  feature,  that
confines  them to  the  dimension of  individual  cases.  Nevertheless,  in  such cases,  the
identification of a normative conflict seems to be a difficult task. This difficulty does not
arise from the fact that certain properties have to be instantiated in order to generate a
contingent normative conflict. Rather, the problem is related to the fact that the conflict is
not made immediately evident by the lexical “surface” of the normative sentences under
evaluation.  Under uncertain circumstances,  the interpreter must  think slow,14 and get
involved in a less intuitive kind of reasoning in order to ascertain the presence of a
conflict. This amounts to say that, for some, we might say “hard”, cases, the antinomy-
detection process demands a cognitive load which is much heavier than the one normally
required  by  “easy”,  stereotypical,  highly  intuitive  cases.  The  instantiation  conflicts
argument offers a mistaken response to this reasonable intuition. 
7  To come full circle, I will suggest that so-called conflicts of instantiation offer precisely
good examples of “hard” cases of antinomies, which, by definition, involve generic cases,
and require a heavy cognitive load by the interpreter. In this way I will move, of course,
from logics to cognition. 
 
2 Conflicts of instantiation: there is a gap in Normative
Systems 
8  NS considers normative conflicts as common defects of real normative systems, along
with normative gaps (the system is incomplete), and conditions of redundancy (the same
solution occurs more than once). From the positivistic perspective of NS, ideal systems
are  consistent, non-redundant  and  complete.  A  normative  conflict  is  described  as  a
special case of inconsistency: we face a normative conflict only if the system ascribes
incompatible solutions to the same general case (for instance: smoking in general), or to
overlapping general cases (for instance: abortion and therapeutic abortion) which belong
to a given Universe of Cases. 
9  NS  contains  several  important  considerations  about  some  theoretical  and  practical
problems  related  to  normative  conflicts.15 First  of  all,  NS  points  out  that  normative
incompatibilities are not directly brought about by the fact that the contents of two norms
(‘p ∧ ¬ p’) are inconsistent: this holds for obligations (‘Op ∧ O¬ p’) and prohibitions (‘Php
∧  Ph¬p’),  but  certainly does not  apply to permissions (‘Pp ∧  P¬p’).  Accordingly,  any
normative  conflict  comes  from the  interplay  of  the  content  variable and  the  deontic-
operator.16 To put it in slightly different terms, we might say that two opposite contents
are not necessarily inconsistency transmitting:17 the existence of a normative conflict is not
simply the outcome of two contradictory contents, taken in conjunction, for it is always
necessary to consider the role played by deontic modalizations. Second, NS weakens the
notion of antinomy, by stipulating that normative inconsistencies are necessarily relative
to a certain universe of cases (UCi), and that a normative set is complete and coherent
with respect to a certain universe of cases (UCi), and to a certain universe of maximal
solutions (USmaxi), only if the relation R between the normative set α, the universe of case
UCi and the universe of maximal solutions (USmaxj) is a function whose domain is UCi.
Third, NS contains a formal definition of consistency.18 
10  Apart from these fundamental considerations, NS does not say much more on this topic.
Actually, we notice that, whereas the analysis of legal gaps offered by Alchourrón and
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Bulygin is very extensive and detailed, normative conflicts receive but a quick overview.19
This choice is surprising: as von Wright,20 Quine,21 and many other prominent analytic
philosophers stressed, normative contradictions are one of the most serious problems in
deontic logic, both from a practical and theoretical perspective. This becomes especially
true if we assume the validity of ex falso quodlibet principle, which basically licenses the
derivation of any proposition whatsoever from two contradictory contents, leading to the
implosion of a system.22 All this deserves close attention and, just in this case, NS seems to
play fast and loose. 
11 Among the other things, NS does not offer any explanation of how two non-cognitive
(namely, non-truth conditional) propositional-like entities, such as ‘Op’ and ‘O ¬p’, bring
about  a  genuine  contradiction,  or  inconsistency.  Is  it  really  possible  to  have
inconsistencies between obligations, if we assume that they do not belong to the domain
of cognition and truth, just like intentions, wishes, and desires don’t? If so, how could we
define ‘contradiction’ and ‘inconsistency’ without bringing back into play the concept of
truth? To be sure, NS doesn’t even mention this philosophical puzzle, let alone offer a
specific solution.23 Second, Alchourrón and Bulygin seem to overshadow the fact that
antinomies are created through interpretation, and that they can also be avoided through
interpretation.24 This detail is very important for applying their model to real, and not
just to ideal, legal orders: if the model does not envisage the fact that antinomies are
produced  by  interpretive  acts  it  loses  explicative  power  and  opens  the  road  to  the
mistaken assumption that  normative conflicts  are  determined by the compositional  or
literal content of the normative statements, whereas normative conflicts are determined
by  the  contextual  content of  those  statement.  Contextual  content  is  incrementally
determined  by  the  interplay  of  literal  meaning  and  background  information:  it  can
express a variety of proposition, or propositional-like entities, by varying background
assumptions.25 
12  Leaving  aside  these  quandaries,  we  can  consider  that  the  most  striking  “gap”  in
Alchourrón  and  Bulygin’s  analysis  seems  to  be  the  lack  of  attention  towards  those
problems related to the notion of instantiation conflict,  which is entirely kept under
wraps.  The  two  authors  assume  straightforwardly  both  that  normative  conflicts  are
entirely  confined within  the  level  of  general  cases,  and that  it  is  possible  to  analyze
antinomies  using  a  conservative  expansion  of  a  basic  system  of  first-order  model
theoretic logic. As we shall see, both assumptions are far from being uncontroversial.
Now, the question is: were Alchourron and Bulygin right in making this assumption? This
dilemma brings us to the main topic of the present essay. In the next paragraphs I shall
explain why, according to my view, they made the right choice, and why we should be
unconvinced by the instantiation conflict’s argument. Before offering a line of argument
that justifies these considerations, I shall present briefly the distinction between generic
cases and individual cases, which plays here the pivotal role: as hinted before, NS assumes
that  antinomies  are  always  conflicts  between  general  cases;  on  the  contrary,  the
argument from instantiation conflicts  is  aimed at  showing that  some antinomies are
necessarily conflict between individual cases.26 
13  General  cases  are  thought  to  have  a  so-called  in  abstracto  dimension,  for  they  are
independent  from  actual  and  individual  objects,  actions,  events  or  circumstances;
individual cases, on their turn, belong to the in concreto dimension, for they correspond to
actual  and individual,  objects,  actions,  events,  or circumstances.  This opposition very
much  resembles  the  distinction  between  universals,  or  ‘the  ways  things  are’,  and
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particulars,  or ‘ways it is’.27 According to Russell (1911),  properties (or “qualities”) are
grouped together as universals, whereas individuals are particulars.28 General cases are
made of properties, and properties stand for classes: the property of being a ‘farmer’ is the
class of all ‘farmers’; not only the actual farmers of the world we live in, but also the
unactualized farmers of  other possible worlds.29 Objects instantiate properties,  in the
sense  that  they  exemplify  them:  ‘tractor’  qua  property  characterizes  all  individual
tractors,  either actualized or not.  When actualized objects exemplify properties,  they
generate state of affairs.30 Abstract entities, instead, encode set(s) of properties, without
instantiating  them.  According  to  a  common  view,  properties  include  relations,
understood as arbitrary classes of ordered n-tuples of things (pairs, triples, and so on).31
14  We can thus conclude that general cases correspond to abstract sets of properties, while
individual cases correspond to particulars, understood as the relevant facts or state of
affairs that should be regulated by the law. Taking it forward, we might want to say that,
from a psychological perspective, general cases correspond to concepts, whereas individual
cases to percepts – the objects of two different mental acts. From a physical perspective,
instead, we observe that particulars correspond to individual objects, or entities, being
thought of as existing in a concrete time and space, whereas non-particulars are abstract
entities,  to  whom  we  ascribe  a  non-spatiotemporal  nature;  they  can  be  thought
independently from some other particular entity.32 According to Lowe, particulars can be
defined in terms of instantiation:33
A particular is something (not necessarily an object) that instantiates but is not
itself instantiated. Universals, on the other hand, necessarily have instances (or, at
least, are instantiable). Thus I think of universals as Kinds. 
15  An instantiation holds when a property is  a constituent part  of  (or is  present in)  a
particular thing: items instantiate properties when they bear, or possess, a property34.
Actually, “to instantiate” basically means to create an instance by defining one particular
variation of object within a class, name this variation, and locating it in some physical
and temporal space. So, for instance, the prohibition of sexual harassment established by
the Italian criminal law (art.  660 c.p.)  regulates a general,  abstract case,  whereas the
individual prescription that obliges Mr. Hugo to pay punitive damages for a breach of a
contract previously stipulated with the x-Society, issued by a judge in flesh and bones,
regulates an individual case. As hinted before, an individual case is a concrete event,
which essentially possesses spatiotemporal properties and relations.35 Anyone, unaided
by a legal theorist, can see the difference between some prohibited generic action of a
penal code, and the concrete, real object of a lawsuit brought before courts. We might
intuit offhand that the latter is a real, independent entity or event, whereas the former is
essentially a property (or, better, a set of properties), which can be predicated of a whole
class of  x-cases.  Accordingly,  generic cases collect  together sets  of  propositions:  they
collect at least one proposition for each atomic entity that can be used to fill the variable
x; or, if you prefer, they collect together all the propositions where the property, or set of
properties, might occur. Propositions about general cases are explicitly presupposed by
propositions about individual cases, but they are not acquainted either with the atomic
propositions that describe the facts of an individual case, or the proposition-like entities
that  ascribe normative qualifications to them.  Rather,  they can be viewed merely as
schematic representations (call them generalizations, if you wish) depicting patterns that
belong to classes of individual cases, which can be considered extensionally alike. 
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16  Now, according to no less authority than Riccardo Guastini,36 Jorge Rodríguez and Pablo
Navarro,37 conflicts  of  instantiation correspond to special  kinds of  antinomies,  which
arise only when certain factual circumstances occur. To put it in a more technical jargon,
they arise only if a certain, specific property is instantiated (i.e. exemplified) in a further
complex entity or state of affairs. Under their view, conflicts of instantiation cannot be
reduced to antinomies in a narrow sense (that is, in abstracto), such as ‘p ⇒ Oq ∧ p ⇒ O ¬q
’. instantiation conflicts transcend the in abstracto dimension, for they appear only if we
reach the level of individual cases. In other words, these “special” antinomies cannot be
detected  by  looking  at  the  system,  without  taking  into  account  also  the  facts of  an
individual case. Let us now explore the argument in greater detail. 
17  A first example of instantiation conflict — call it ‘the tractor case’ — is given by the
following two sentence-types:38 
(NST1) “Vehicles are not allowed to enter in this area.”
(NST2) “Agricultural machineries are allowed to enter in this area.”
18  Following  the  symbolism proposed  by  NS,  endorsed  also  by  the  proponents  of  the
argument from instantiation conflict, a possible formalization of the norms expressed by
NST1 and NST2, respectively, is the following:
(N1) ‘p ⇒ Phs’
(N2) ‘q ⇒ Ps’
where p represents the “fact of being a vehicle”, q represents “the fact of being
agricultural machinery”, ‘P’ stands for ‘permitted’, ‘Ph’ stands for ‘prohibited’, and,
finally, ‘s’ stands for the action of ‘entering this area’. We use ‘⇒’ as a symbol for material
implication. If we look at these formulae, we get the impression that the two norms are
not contradictory at all, for they display different antecedents.39 However, this conclusion
seems to be false because, according to our semantic intuitions, the proposition-like
contents of NST1 and NST2 produce a normative conflict if, under specific circumstances,
there is a real, individual entity ‘a’ that instantiates both the property of being a vehicle,
and the property of being an agricultural machinery. Consequently, the entity ‘a’ is both
permitted and prohibited to get into this area. Now, if this is correct, NS-apparatus seems
to be missing something. According to the instantiation conflicts argument, what NS
lacks is the following element: in such a case, the antinomy appears only when we come
to decide about an actual, individual case (namely, an in concreto case). For instance, a
decision-maker must determine whether “Il Lamborghini”, the tractor of Mr. Hugo – a
local farmer from a small town named “Gemona” – is allowed to enter into the park.
19  A second example of instantiation conflict, expounded by Jorge Rodríguez in a couple of
his essays, is what we might call ‘the traffic light case’.40 Also in this case we have two
normative sentence-types: the first prescribes that (NST3) “Drivers ought to stop in front
of red lights”, and the second prescribes that (NST4) “Drivers ought not to stop in front a
military base”.41 Although these norms seem to be in abstracto consistent, an instantiation
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conflict arises whenever “it happens” that an actual driver finds a red light in front of a
military base: let’s say, Mr. Hugo is driving “Il Lamborghini” in front of the NATO airbase
located in Aviano, and he suddenly finds a red light on his way. To put it in Navarro and
Rodríguez’s words:42 
The example shows that two seemingly consistent norms can produce a normative
conflict given the occurrence of certain factual circumstances [The stress is mine]. In our
example, the joint verification of conditions p and r – red light and military zone –
renders as a result the obligation and prohibition to stop (Oq and O¬q). Therefore,
here  is  a  new  element  that  has  to  be  taken  into  consideration  for a  proper
characterization of normative inconsistency: a set of norms can be inconsistent via
certain facts – under the occurrence of certain factual circumstances [The stress is mine]
– and inconsistent via other facts.
20 A third example, always taken from Navarro and Rodríguez’s works, is what we might
label ‘the ten dollars credit case’.  Let us imagine a normative system that contains a
general norm which prescribes that for any x and y, if x has a credit from y, then it is
obligatory for y to pay x:
(GN) ‘∀ x,y: (Axy ⇒ O(Pyx))’
where ‘x’ and ‘y’ are variables for individuals, ‘A’ stands for the relational property of
having a credit and ‘P’ stands for the action of paying. According to Navarro and
Rodríguez, “[a] norm such as this can contradict no other norm in a given normative
system and, nevertheless, generate a conflict if applied to particular situations: for
example, both ‘a’ and ‘c’ have credits of ten dollars from ‘b’, and ‘b’ has only ten dollars.”43
In such a case, “[o]ur norm produces a conflict for b, because when applied to the
considered situations it generates two obligations that b cannot jointly satisfy”:
(N*) ‘Aab ⇒ O(Pba)’
(N**) ‘Acb ⇒ O(Pbc)’
21  In the same vein, Guastini remarks that most of the collisions between constitutional
principles can be qualified as antinomies in concreto.44 He brings ‘the unemployed tax case’
as a paradigmatic example: a constitution contains two norms N1 and N2; N1 imposes on
citizens an obligation to pay the taxes, whereas N2 settles an exception to the effect that
unemployed people are allowed not to pay the taxes. Considered both the possibility of
unemployed foreigners, and the possibility of employed citizens, we can conclude that an
instantiation conflict arises for individuals that are both citizens and unemployed – say,
Mr.  Hugo  is  an  Italian  citizen,  and  he  lost  his  job due  to  the  collapse  of  Gemona’s
Agricultural Cooperative. 
22  Guastini, Rodríguez and others claimed that, in the abovementioned situations, a certain
set of norms becomes inconsistent through certain facts,45 or through an interpretation in
concreto (of the salient normative sentence-types.46 Interpretation in concreto, on its turn,
is understood as a kind of individual subsumption (namely, the operation of placing an
actual entity, action, or event under the scope of a quantified predicate such as ‘every
citizen’, ‘every murder’, and so on).47 In other words, the proponents of the instantiation
Let’s talk about antinomies
Revus, 36 | 2018
7
conflicts argument claim that, in all the abovementioned examples and analogous cases,
normative conflicts are produced by the contingent “joint occurrence” of two consistent
normative antecedents,48 and not (only) by the inferential relations between norms qua 
abstract  semantic  entities  that  provide  solutions  to  general  cases.  Therefore,
instantiation conflicts shall be considered to all effects as “facts-dependent” normative
conflicts.  Accordingly,  a  good  theory  of  antinomies  has  to  distinguish  between  two
categories of normative conflicts: antinomies in abstracto, which are directly produced by
inconsistencies of the normative systems (such as ‘p ⇒ Oq ∧ p ⇒ O ¬q’); antinomies in
concreto  (namely,  conflicts  of  instantiation),  whose  existence  stems  from contingent,
individual connections between the antecedents of two generic, non-conflictive norms:49
Situations such as this may be called conflicts of instantiation, because they involve
individual norms logically derivable from at least one general norm, or instances of
application  of  the  same  general  norm,  that  generate  a  conflict  because  it  is
empirically impossible jointly to satisfy them. 
23  Let me offer the very last example, to be even clearer on the point. According to this
view, if our system contains two norms such as N1 ‘If you are a legal philosopher, then
you are obliged to smoke’ and N2 ‘ If you are a legal philosopher, then you are allowed not
to smoke’, it is the system itself the sole responsible for bringing about a contradiction.
Apparently, this statement is shown to be true by following test: we can realize that there
is  a  normative conflict  in every possible  world,  even without  considering any actual
situation where, say, Mr. Hugo – the famous farmer and legal philosopher from Gemona –
is smoking his pipe. On the opposite, conflicts of instantiations are “caused” by empirical,
individual  properties  of  an  actual  case.  They  involve  consistent  norms  that,  under
peculiar circumstances, cannot be jointly satisfied, due to some factual limitation and,
therefore, generate also a conflict in the system.
24  If  my  understanding  is  correct,  the  relevant  consequences  of  the  argument  from
instantiation conflict are, at least, five: 
25 (1) Sometimes, the identification of a normative conflict is logically dependent from the
identification of the facts of the case, regarded as actual actions, events or state of affairs
or,  at  any rate,  real,  actualized objects,  which literally  “causes”  the outbreak of  the
conflict, according to a notion of causation that still has to be determined.
26 (2) The structure of a legal system is not entirely determined by the internal relations
between the  norms  that  it  comprises  but,  under  specific  circumstances,  also  by  the
external relations between norms and individual cases, insofar as conflicts of instantiation
are connected with a purely “factual” knowledge about a concrete case.
27 (3) In order to identify an instantiation conflict, our inferential competence is not sufficient,
for a referential competence is also required. In other words, the detection of a normative
conflict, in some occasions, requires the cognitive ability of categorizing, that is, to “judge
that a particular thing is or is not an instance of a particular category”.50 Following Diego
Marconi (1997) we can draw a sharp distinction between these two different abilities: the
former can be called “inferential”, for it involves our inferential performances; the latter
can be called referential, for “it has been characterized as the ability to apply words to
the real world”.51 As pointed out by Marconi, scientific experiments – such as the ones
conducted  by  the  neuropsychologist  Glyn  Humphreys  on  brain-injured  persons  –
confirmed that these two abilities are separated: it is possible to know perfectly what a
panda bear is, without having also the ability to recognize a real one, and vice versa.
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28 (4) If all of this is correct, a “deductivist” model that considers normative systems as
closed under the notion of logical consequence,  offers a misleading representation of
antinomies, for it does not account for those cases where normative contradictions arise
only within certain contexts, and disappear in others.52 This salient feature contributes to
place limits to classic deontic logic qua method for the analysis of normative systems.
29 (5) If, as I think, general cases play a special role in NS, for they seem to give determine
and give unity to the content of a legal system, the argument from instantiation conflict is
even more dangerous. General cases offer a minimal basis for characterizing and unifying
the content of a system for three reasons: first, they establish what properties are relevant
for the system; second, they characterize concrete cases (through classification); third,
they are capable of repeated instantiation within a legal order. Thus, we might conclude
that, under Alchourrón and Bulygin’s view, general cases carve the ‘ought’ dimension at
the joints. If the proponents of the instantiation conflict argument are right, one of the
fundamental functions attributed to general cases (namely: grant unity to the system) in
NS cannot be entirely performed.53 
30  All these dramatic implications go directly against the core of NS analysis of antinomies.
If individual cases might be seen as causal relata, as explained before, then we do not
have  a  clear-cut  separation  between  ‘is’  and  ‘ought’.  Moreover,  if  the  facts  of  an
individual  case  determine  the  possibility  of  a  normative  conflict,  then  it  becomes
impossible to maintain that normative systems are closed under logical  consequence.
Finally, the fashion of giving unity to the content of a system proposed by NS encounters
strong limitations.
 
3 A reductionist strategy
31  In opposition to the claim raised by the argument from instantiation conflicts, I consider
that a reductionist approach “NS-style” is perfectly feasible: we can remain faithful to the
conservative idea that conflicts of instantiation can be treated as antinomies in abstracto,
namely, conflicts between deontic modalization of general cases, which can be detected
within the system, and without taking into account individual cases. In this regard, I shall
invite attention to a salient detail: all the examples proposed by Rodríguez, Navarro and
Guastini portrait general situations, where certain sentence-types about general actions have
to be interpreted. Take the examples examined in the previous paragraph: they never
involve  actual interpretations  of  contextualized  normative  sentence-types,  let  alone
normative utterance-tokens. This consideration suggests that the boundary of general
cases has not been trespassed. However, this piece of evidence is not enough to score a
point  against  the  existence  of  instantiation  conflicts:  we  need  to  build  up  a  proper
counter-argument.  Now,  I  think  that  we  owe  to  Giovanni  Battista  Ratti  the  most
convincing line of argument which shows that, from a purely logical point of view, those
cases presented under the label “conflicts of instantiation” are by no means different
than any standard case of antinomy in abstracto, that is, conflict between general cases;
his proof deservers a detailed overview.54 
32  Ratti argues that, if we look at the traffic light case, at the agricultural machinery case, at
the  ten  dollars  credit  case,  and  similar  cases,  we  can  notice  that,  although  the
antecedents of the two conflictive norms, at first glance, seem completely unrelated, even
after a translation into a proposition-like calculus, the norms of the system still produce a
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conflict in abstracto, and not an instantiation conflict. In fact, two norms such as (N1) ‘p ⇒
Oq’ and (N2) ‘r ⇒ ¬O q’ are in conflict whenever the conjunction of the two generic cases ‘p
∧ r’  is “conceptually possible” or, in other words, when there is no strict implication
between general ‘p’ and general ‘¬r’, or between general ‘r’ and general ‘¬p’. In order to
bring about the antinomy in the abstract dimension of general cases it is sufficient to
apply antecedent strengthening either to N1 or N2. Antecedent strengthening states that
the proposition ‘if p then q’ entails (is evidence or validates) the proposition ‘if p and r
then q’.55 In this way, we can derive (N1
*) ‘p ∧ r ⇒ Oq’ from (N1) ‘p ⇒ O q’, and (N2*) ‘r ∧ p
⇒ ¬Oq’ (which is equivalent to (N2**) ‘p ∧ r ⇒ ¬Oq’) from (N2) ‘r ⇒ ¬Oq’.56 
33  Let us take Guastini’s “unemployed citizen” as a test-case. We have (N1) ‘if x is a citizen,
then x is obliged to pay the taxes’ and (N2) ‘if x is unemployed, then x is not obliged to pay
taxes’. Now, by virtue of the meaning of the words ‘citizen’ and ‘unemployed’, we infer
that there is no strict implication between ‘citizen’ and ‘non-unemployed’, or between
‘non-citizen’ and ‘unemployed’. Then, how could we bring about the antinomy between
general cases? The answer is simple: we have to apply the antecedent strengthening’s
principle, and derive, first, (N1*) ‘if x is a citizen and unemployed, then x is obliged to pay
the taxes’ from (N1) ‘if x is a citizen, then x is obliged to pay the taxes’; second, we derive
(N2*) ‘if x is unemployed and citizen, then x is not obliged to pay the taxes’ from (N2) ‘if x
is unemployed, then he is not obliged to pay the taxes’. It is now possible to observe that
the derived norms N1* and N2* are in conflict and, evidently, this is a conflict between
general cases.57 In fact, it seems as clear as anything can be in philosophy that, even in
this case, we have not made any reference to the singularities of individual cases. After
all, we are still talking about citizens and unemployed as general categories. On these
premises,  Ratti  concludes  that  the  instantiation  conflicts  argument  is  flawed,  for  it
confuses the empirical occurrence of an antinomy with the conceptual identification of the
antinomy itself.58 I shall return on this point later.
34  Now, Ratti  makes his argument even stronger by showing that,  relying on the same
strategy adopted by Rodríguez and Guastini,59 it is well possible to build up examples of
instantiation conflicts using hypothetical norms whose antecedents contain predicates
that  quantify  over  empty sets.  If  a  predicate  quantifies  over  an empty set,  then,  by
definition, it cannot denote any actual, individual state of affairs, action, event, object or
entity. The proof is highly intuitive, and therein lies its strength. In fact, Ratti proposes to
imagine a micro-system composed by a first norm (N1) ‘The owners of unicorns shall pay
a  tax’  and  a  second  norm  (N2)  ‘The  owners  of  meek  animals  shall  not  pay  a  tax’.
Considered that, according to Ratti, unicorns do not exist (his usual ontology corresponds
to a non-generous form of conceptualism), the normative conflict between N1 and N2 is
independent from any instantiation of the relational property of being both a unicorn
and a meek animal. Once again, a “purely conceptual relation” between unicorns (which
are not our world-mates)  and meek animals  is  the ultimate source of  the normative
conflict between N1 and N2. 
35  The gist of Ratti’s argument then is that every case of normative conflict is determined
by  overlapping  predicates  referred  to  placeholders for  individuals,  under  a  certain
interpretation (whoever stops in front of whatever red light which is placed just in front of
whatever army base), and not by rigid designators (here I am using in a somehow “liberal”
fashion the jargon introduced by Kripke 1980), pointing to actual individuals or events (
that traffic light just in front of that military airbase, in Aviano). The (Fregean) sense of the
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normative  statement  is  not  anchored  to  any  individual  entity,  for  the  norm can be
satisfied by a whole set of individuals and events that fall under the scope of those terms
that fulfill  a  predicative function.  Consequently,  the instantiation conflicts  enthusiast
confuses  the  empirical  occurrence  of  a  normative  conflict  with  the  conceptual
identification of the normative conflict itself. 
36  I  would like to add some fuel  to Ratti’s  argument. Let me begin with the charge of
blurring  the  distinction between identification  and occurrence of  a  normative  conflict,
which he  addresses  to  the  friends  of  instantiation conflicts.  To  be  sure,  we  have  to
concede the following point: in a wholly trivial sense, it is somehow true that a certain
property must be instantiated in an actual case for bringing about a “real”,  “actual”,
normative conflict, which might discussed by a judge in flesh and bones, provided that
the property is connected to incompatible deontic modalizations (for instance: prohibited
and permitted). If Mr. Hugo does not drive “Il Lamborghini” in front of a military airbase,
then he will never be arraigned on a road traffic charge. Or, if our good Mr. Hugo
becomes too old to drive his tractor, then he will never get into a position where he might
find a red light in front of a military base while driving. Thus, we will never come to apply
the traffic norms of  our micro-system to him; these norms will  remain,  so to speak,
“Hugo-inert”,  and  the  normative  conflict  never  arises  in  any  “real”,  actual  trial
concerning Hugo’s conduct as a driver considered that he simply couldn’t be a driver. These
are trivial truths  but,  as  Ratti  correctly  maintains,  they tell  us  something about  the
empiric possibility of a normative conflict, and not about the identification of a normative
conflict within a certain normative system. In other words,  they involve the relation
between normative micro-systems (in our case:  a portion road traffic regulation) and
empirical  facts  (Mr.  Hugo’s  ability/possibility  to  drive),  but  not  about  the  relation
between the items of a normative system. Moreover, what is most important, this trivial
truth cannot be used to build a hard-edged case for the distinction between antinomies
understood in a narrow sense and conflicts of instantiation, for it is a trivial truth about
every antinomy  whatsoever,  including  the  most  paradigmatic  examples  of  conflicts
between general cases.
37  Let us consider, for instance, the conflict between ‘Smoking is allowed’ and ‘Smoking is
not allowed’. Even in such a case, if nobody is smoking or if, in our world, suddenly and
for  some obscure  reasons,  it  becomes  just  impossible  to  smoke,  the  two in  abstracto
conflictive norms remain inert, and they will not generate a “real” normative conflict, for
they cannot be instantiated. Actually, ‘Smoking is allowed/Smoking is not allowed’ really
means something like ‘for every x,  x is permitted to smoke/not permitted to smoke’,
where ‘x is  permitted’  is a function that only comes into a complete proposition-like
entity through the values of this function. Thus, there is a sense in which any antinomy is
a conflict in concreto, in so far as judges discuss antinomies only if they are connected with
the atomic fact of a real litigation. On the other hand, this feature does not prevent us to
understand that, within the system, these two norms are conflictive, just as we can realize
(with a little more cognitive effort,  perhaps) that,  within the system,  ‘vehicles are not
allowed in the park’ and ‘agricultural machineries are allowed in the park’ are conflictive,
as demonstrated by Ratti’s antecedent-strengthening argument. It’s worth stressing that,
even in real  litigations,  particular cases are characterized through general cases,  and
conflicts between universals occur in all possible worlds. Thus, any argument based on
this trivial truth would not serve as a justification for the distinction between conflicts
between general cases and conflicts of instantiation. At best, it might offer good reasons
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for saying that every antinomy has a double dimension, actual and abstract, and that there
are two different senses of ‘existence’ qua predicate of ‘normative conflict’: in abstracto-
existence, or ‘existence within a system’, and in concreto-existence, or ‘existence in a actual
case’.  For all  these reasons,  Ratti  recommends being careful,  and keeping occurrence
separate from identification. 
38  It might be also objected that the confusion between empirical occurrence and (abstract)
identification reaches the highest degree in the ten dollars credit case, which involves
only  one  norm,  which  is  clearly  not  a  self-contradiction  and,  therefore,  cannot  be
conflictive by definition. The situation represented in the example is rather a problem of
purely factual impossibility: a certain agent b is facing a tragic choice, because he is unable
to comply with an abstract norm, due to his scarce resources. The agent b has only ten
dollars in his pocket money, but his total debt towards his creditors a and c amounts to
twenty dollars. Whether he decides to pay a, or to pay c he will not comply with his
obligation. It might be also objected that this confusion is a byproduct the ‘impossibility-
of-joint-commitment-test’, whose inadequacy was pointed out by Hamner Hill in his 1987
essay  “A  Functional  Taxonomy  of  Normative  Conflicts”.  Hamner  Hill  observed  that
“[m]ost philosophical analysis of the problem of normative conflict identify instances of
normative conflict, through a specific test: the ‘impossibility-of-joint-commitment-test’60.
According  to  this  test,  “a  normative  legal  conflict  exists  when  and  only  when  it  is
impossible for one norm subject to comply with both of a pair of norms.” This test is “too
narrow”,61 since it defines normative conflicts as impossibility of the joint compliance of
two norms, it cannot account for antinomies that involve permissions; further problems
arise if we want to analyze empowerments. On these premises, Hamner Hill develops a
functional  understanding of  normative conflict,  and a  taxonomical  classification that
distinguishes  between  three  species  of  conflicts:  normative  contradiction  (a  conflict
between obligations),  normative collision (a conflict between permissions,  or between
obligations and permissions),  and normative competition (cases in which the conflict
involve  norms  of  distinct  jurisdictions).  Now,  an  extended  analysis  of  Hamner  Hill’s
proposal goes far beyond the scope of the present contribution. However, I think it is
worth  stressing  that  the  notion  of  impossibility  of  joint  compliance,  taken  as  a
definitional tool for antinomy, might open the road for the confusion between empirical
occurrence of a normative conflict, and a genuine normative contradiction or collision
within a certain system. 
39  A second issue raised by Ratti’s argument is the idea that it might subsist a “conceptual
connection” between two apparently unrelated norms. As we said before,  in order to
prove that every antinomy is  primarily a conflict  between general  cases,  we have to
explain how two apparently unrelated norms such as (N1)’p ⇒ Oq’  and (N2) ‘r ⇒ ¬O q’
might  be  in  abstracto  inconsistent  by  virtue  of  what  Ratti  calls  the  “conceptual
connections” between the two contents ‘p’ and ‘r’. The proof shall satisfy the ‘generality
constraint’:  the contents of  the two norms must include only abstract properties and
individual variables, and shall not contain individual elements of any actual case. Now, if
we look at the representation of N1 and N2 it turns out that, under this formalization, N1
and N2 are unanalyzed predications: ‘p’ and ‘r’ are variables for propositional contents;
but we might wonder what are their respective constituents, and how do they relate to
each other. There is not such a thing as a free lunch here. An extension of first-order
propositional calculus with deontic operators will not do the job. The explanation of how
N1 and N2 might be conflictive necessarily passes through a reconstruction of the sub-
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sentential constituents of ‘p’ and ‘q’, respectively, and of their relations. The explanation
must show that ‘p’ and ‘q’ have something in common. In order to reach this goal, we have
to make explicit what Carnap used to call the meaning postulates of the constituent of ‘p’
and ‘q’  respectively.  Going back to  our  examples,  we have to  show how agricultural
machineries and vehicles, meek animals and unicorns, traffic lights and military airbases,
might be brought together under the same class.  This task belongs to the domain of
semantics, while Ratti’s argument was essentially aimed at making a point about logic: the
two strategies can be combined together. 
40  Now,  meaning  postulates  are  semantic  stipulations  on  the  relation  between  the
extensions of lexical items that specify the necessary and sufficient condition for the
semantic application of a concept. For instance, (MPB) ‘(∀x) (bachelor(x) ⊆ ¬married(x))’
stipulates that every individual which is under the extension of ‘bachelor’ is not under
the  extension  of  ‘married’;  in  other  words,  it  offers  a  mental  representation  of  the
necessary and (in Carnap’s seminal account) sufficient conditions for something to be a
bachelor.  These  postulates  become  descriptive  constants  that  have  the  function  of
validating semantically based inferences,62 which are constitutive of the meaning of a
word or phrase. They can be considered as translations of lexical items into signs of a
(meta-)  language  L  constituted  by  customary  connectives,  individual  variables,
quantifiers, individual constants (‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’…) and primitive descriptive predicates (‘B’, ‘M’,
‘R’…).63 Meaning  postulates  might  provide  partial  definition,  but  they  tend  to
completeness:  we  acquire  the  complete  extension  of  a  lexical  by  adding  semantic
components  (individual  variables,  constant,  quantifiers  and  so  on)  to  an  initial
representation. 
41  Let us consider the term ‘unicorn’: we start by saying that all unicorns are ‘legendary
objects’, and then we add that they ‘have a horn’, that they are ‘meek animals’, that they
have  a  relational  property  of  similarity  with  ‘horses’  and  so  forth.  Through  this
definitional process, we might try to reduce ‘unicorn’ to primitive components, in order
to obtain what Carnap used to call “observational sentences” or “protocol sentences”.
However, these definitional components might not even be primitive: they might denote
functional  or  cultural  factors,  other  complex  entities,  and  other  non-observational
elements. For instance, we can define ‘building’ in terms of ‘physical object, non-living,
big,  artifact’,  where ‘artifact’  denotes a highly abstract,  cultural concept.64 We can do
pretty much the same thing with the word ‘unicorn’, which can be defined as ‘character
of a fairytale world’, where ‘fairytale world’ is evidently a cultural element. According to
Jackendoff (1983: 121), the sorts of conditions required to specify word meanings are, at
least, three: necessary conditions, graded conditions, and conditions that are typical, but might
be subject to exceptions. In our example, a necessary condition for ‘unicorn’ is being a
legendary object, a graded condition is being the same size of a horse, and a condition
that might be subject to exception could be having a horn (which might have been cut
during a legendary battle). 
42  If we bring meaning postulates into the picture, we can explain how the sentence ‘x is a
meek animal’ is entirely deducible from ‘x is a unicorn’, without adding further premises,
for ‘meek animal’ provides a partial definition of ‘unicorn’. The inference ‘x is a unicorn,
therefore x is a meek animal’ seems to be guaranteed by the proposition to the effect that
it is part of the meaning of ‘unicorn’ that unicorns are meek animals. It is not as one has
to get involved in the analysis of the facts of an individual case, or in a sociological study
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on the behavior of unicorns. These premises can be taken as a point of departure for a
rejoinder to the friends of the instantiation conflict argument.65 
43  Let us examine, for instance, a little variation of the agricultural machinery case. We
have  a  micro-system  composed  by  two  norms:  the  first  norm  (N1)  prescribes:  “The
importation of vehicles is prohibited”; instead, the second norm (N2) prescribes: “The
importation of agricultural machinery is permitted”. We can use ‘M(h)’ to symbolize the
machinery of  Mr.  Hugo,  supposing that this is  a sufficiently definite description of  a
single object. We might even refer to the machinery as “Il Lamborghini”, and introduce
an individual constant ‘a’ for denoting Il Lamborghini. Be as it may, at a certain point, we
would like to predicate something about ‘M(h)’ alias ‘a’. For instance, we might want to
say that Il Lamborghini, the machinery that belongs to Mr. Hugo, is a tractor. In this case
we introduce the predicative constant ‘T’ (which stands for ‘tractor’, and then we obtain ‘
T(a)’, which means ‘Il Lamborghini is a tractor’, or ‘T ((M)h))’, which is equivalent to ‘The
machinery of Mr. Hugo is a tractor’.66 Now, the predicative constant is a general term, for
it can be predicated of more than one individual:67 sure enough, terms in predicative
function express properties, and refer to classes of objects. Now, as far as the meaning
postulates (which here I present under the form of implications) (MPT1) ‘for every x, if x is
a tractor (T) then x is also an agricultural machinery (AM)’, and (MPT2) ‘for every x, if x is a
tractor (T) then x is also a vehicle (V)’, hold, ‘T(x)’ and, therefore, ‘T(a)’ have two more
properties that validate ‘AM(a) ∧ V(a)’. This is not an epistemic matter, for it is related to
the semantic rules that determine the use of certain expressions.
44  We shall now only introduce the action-predicate (‘I’), which stands for ‘importation’,
along with the deontic modalities ‘permitted’ (‘P’) and prohibited (‘Ph’), and the deed is
done.68 If we combine ‘I’ with ‘x is an agricultural machinery (AM)’ and with ‘x is a vehicle
(V)’ we obtain ‘I((AM) x)’ and I((V) x)’. Then, we introduce the deontic operators ‘P’ and
‘Ph’. Remember that our starting points were the norms (N1) ‘for every x, if x is a vehicle
then it is prohibited the importation of x’ and (N2) ‘ for every x, if x is an agricultural
machinery then it is permitted the importation of x’. We can translate them in our toy-
language as follows: (N1) ‘∀x: Ph(I((V)x))’; (N2) ‘∀x: P(I((MA)x)’ and, relying on MPT1 and MP
T2, derive from them, respectively, (N1*) ‘∀x: Ph(I((T)x))’ and (N2*) ‘∀x: P(I(T)x)’. We have
the whole picture now: in every tractor case, we have an antinomy between the general
norms N1 and N2 because, by virtue of the meaning postulates MPT1 and MPT2, we know
that every tractor is both agricultural machinery and a vehicle. Sure enough, the conflict
does not concern only Il Lamborghini, the agricultural machinery/vehicle of Mr. Hugo, for
it rather concerns every x that is both a vehicle (V) and agricultural machinery (AM). As
we can see, all  these relations are purely inferential:  it is not necessary to make any
reference to the individual properties of a concrete object or event. Indeed ‘tractor’ is a
structured complex of other concepts such as ‘agricultural machinery’ and ‘vehicle’, for it
literally has these concepts as proper parts (‘∀x: Tx ⊆ AMx ∧ Vx). In other words, ‘tractor’
couldn’t be tokened without ‘agricultural machinery’ and ‘vehicle’ being tokened. On the
other side, there is an inferential relation between ‘tractor’ and ‘vehicle’, and between
‘tractor’ and ‘agricultural machinery’. Even though ‘vehicle’ does not contain ‘tractor’,
there is  a privileged relation between the concepts:  we can entertain the concept of
‘vehicle’ without having tokened tractor, but if we think about all the possible vehicles,
we should have an inferential disposition that links ‘vehicle’ to ‘tractor’. 
45  We  can  apply  this  reductionist  strategy  also  to  the  traffic  light  case  and  to  the
unemployed tax case. We might also want to develop a more accurate formalization of
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this semantic phenomenon. However, all this involve a lot of tiresome details that are out
of place here, for they go beyond the modest purpose of this paper. Let me just make a
brief clarification: in the traffic light case it will be sufficient to use a definite description
of the place where the traffic light is placed, which can apply to other similar places as
well. As we have seen, a model theoretic propositional semantics enriched with deontic
operators (the one used in NS) won’t  do the job.  We have to penetrate the semantic
structure of individual words in context: as Frege pointed out, these elements are the
Gedankenbausteine of thought.69 This requires us to go beyond NS-semantics, which does
not provide any lexical information for the use of words:70 the model has to be enriched
with a system of meaning postulates, which should ideally tend to completeness.71 The
theoretical payoff of the strategy that we have just proposed is twofold. On the one hand,
we might even get rid of the antecedent strengthening’s principle. On the other hand, we
are  allowed  to  analyze  the  tractor  case,  the  ten  dollars  credit  case,  and  all  the
abovementioned examples as partial normative conflicts;72 namely, cases where there is a
partial identity or (if you prefer a less demanding mereological claim) an overlap of the
antecedents  of  the  two norms.  The  intersection  is  determined by  the  presence  of  a
common property in the meaning postulates.73
 
4 Normative conflicts and cognitive load
46  We  saw  above  that  every  example  of  instantiation  conflict  involves  a  mental
representation of two case-types that, taken in conjunction, bring about an antinomy. We
then considered that, contrary to Rodríguez, Navarro and Guastini’s view, this antinomy
is not linked to the facts of an individual case and, therefore, can be detected in abstracto.
Still,  we  might  not  want  to  jettison  altogether  the  intuitions  that  stand  behind  the
instantiation conflicts argument. I think that there is more to say for the instantiation
conflicts argument than Rodríguez, Navarro and Guastini themselves say.
47  In  one  way  or  another,  so-called  “instantiation  conflict”  require  a  heavy  work  of
reconstruction of  the semantic derivations of  the sub-sentential  expressions (such as
“vehicle”  and  “agricultural  machinery”)  that  constitute  the  contents  of  the  norms
(‘vehicles are allowed/not allowed’), in order to detect the potential, abstract conflicts
between generic cases. In every example of instantiation conflicts examined before, the
interpreter should penetrate the deep semantic structures expressed by the normative
sentence-types under consideration, in order to realize that the two statements might
express conflictive norms. If we want to put it in Carnap’s jargon, she has to identify the
meaning postulates of the terms that constitute the propositions-like entities, to check
whether the norms expressed are incompatible or not. If, instead, we want to remain
more faithful  the lexicon introduced by NS,  we might  say that  she has to make the
structure of the UD more explicit, by digging deeper, and spelling out more properties
that belong to the antecedents of the conditional norms of the system.74 
48  Going back to one of our examples, we can understand that the interpreter has to start
an inquiry  into  the meaning-postulates  of  “vehicle” and “agricultural  machinery” to
understand that “Vehicles are not allowed in the park” and “Agricultural machineries are
allowed in the park”, under a certain interpretation, might express conflictive norms.
This mental process might not be as intuitive as the kind of reasoning that enables a
competent speaker to grasp that “Smoking is permitted” and “Smoking is prohibited”, or
“Vehicles are allowed in the park” and “Cars are not allowed in the park” could express
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conflictive norms. In the former case, the connection between “Smoking is permitted”
and “Smoking is  prohibited”  is  established by a  partial  identity  of  lexical  items,  for
“smoking”  is  present  in  both  sentences.  And  also  in  the  latter  case  the  connection
between “vehicles” and “cars” is straightforward, because “cars” are normally used in
extensional definitions of vehicles, due to the fact that cars are paradigmatic examples of
vehicles. 
49  The inquiry into meaning-postulates constitutes a further level of analysis, apt at making
extensions more explicit.75 In order to reach that level, we have to translate normative
statements into partial definitions, and then turn these partial definitions into (relative)
complete definitions. Sometimes, partial definitions are difficult to articulate,76 and also
turning a partial definition into a full definition is not an easy task: there is an epistemic
risk of encoding insufficient or incorrect information – after all, partial definitions are
specified in a piecemeal way. This mental process might eventually require a high level of
epistemic (or cognitive effort). Following Longo and Barrett,77 we can define cognitive effort
as follows:
Theories  of  information  processing  consider  cognitive  effort  as  a  hypothetical
construct,  regarded  as  a  limited  capacity  resource  that  affects  the  speed  of
information processing. […] [I]f a task is resource limited, then the performance
will improve if more cognitive effort is allocated to the task. Although cognitive
effort  may be a hypothetical  construct,  it  is  a  subjective state that people have
introspective  access  to.  It  is  a  multi-faceted  phenomenon:  it  can  be  related  to
physiological states of stress and effort, to subjective experiences of stress, mental
effort, time pressure and to objective measures of performance level. 
50  Now, I would suggest that the fundamental distinction between the ten dollars credit
case,  the  unemployed  citizen  case,  the  tractor  case,  and  a  paradigmatic  example  of
antinomy such as “Vehicles are not allowed in the park” and “Cars are allowed in the
park” is that, normally, the formers require a higher level of cognitive effort in order to
be detected. And this is just because the cognitive connections between the meanings of
“unemployed”  and  “citizens”,  or  the  meanings  of  “vehicles”  and  “agricultural
machineries” are less direct and intuitive than the cognitive links between the meanings
“vehicles” and “cars”. Under normal circumstances, the discovery of these links requires
the interpreter to undertake costly inferences (that is, thinking slow). This is precisely the
source  of  the  wrong  impression  that  so-called  “instantiation  conflicts”  display  some
logical peculiarity, or that the thinking process has necessarily analyzed the real facts of
an individual case.  After all,  as we have said before,  every normative conflict can be
reduced to a clash between generic cases; the only difference is just related to cognitive
process  and,  more specifically,  concerns the level  of  cognitive effort  required in the
interpretive  process.  The  identification  of  the  conceptual  links  between  ‘therapeutic
abortion’  and  ‘abortion’  is  less  demanding  with  respect  to  the  identification  of  the
conceptual links between ‘cars’ and ‘agricultural machinery’. These conceptual links rely
on meaning postulates. 
51  An additional argument might be adduced in favor of the hypothesis that I suggest. In
fact, we can design examples of antinomies that, no doubt, involve generic cases and that:
first,  are  cognitively  demanding (even more demanding than the cases  presented by
Rodríguez,  Guastini  and  Navarro);  second,  are  intuitively  similar  to  conflicts  of
instantiations. The most striking examples might be offered by conflicts between opaque
norms. According to Damiano Canale (2014), we say that a norm is “opaque” if “a relevant
portion of the sense of the normative text and the applied norm is totally unknown”. In
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spite of the fact that there is no ambiguity, vagueness, or genericity, “the norm is not
completely intelligible to the decision-maker”. As Canale points out, opaque norms are
generally connected with scientific thought: they have been drafted by experts (chemists,
physicists, and so on), and then approved by the legislature. Analogously, judges rely on
the intervention of experts in the field in order to apply these norms to individual cases,
because they lack the scientific knowledge required to grasp the meaning of these norms.
In other words, under opacity, decision-makers do not posses the inferential competence
that is necessary to understand the cognitive content of the norms. A conflict between
opaque norms, by definition, is very demanding from a cognitive point of view, for it
requires complex scientific knowledge in order to be detected,  and,  according to our
intuitions, seems very similar to an example of instantiation conflict. 
52  Let us imagine, for instance, a normative system composed by two norms. The first norm
states: “Fires are allowed”; the second norm says: “Exothermic oxidoreduction of organic
material is not allowed”. Beyond any doubt, there is a conflict in abstracto between this
norms, but we don't know it immediately, because the two norms are opaque: in order to
understand that there is a normative conflict, we have to start an inquiry in the meaning-
postulate of “fire”, which will get us to know that “to pick up a fire” basically means to
generate an exothermic oxidoreduction of organic material. Another example might be
the following: (N1) “Smoking tobacco is permitted”; (N2) “The consumption of combusted
leaves of solanaceae containing C10H14N2 is prohibited.”
78 We must slog on the meaning
postulates of tobacco in order to get its chemical formulation, and to understand that the
two norms bring about a conflict between generic cases. These examples have something
in common with the cases proposed by Guastini,  Navarro and Rodríguez: they are all
conflicts between general cases that are hard to detect, due to the fact that the decision-
maker is unable to grasp intuitively the relations between the norms expressed by the
normative statements that she has to interpret.
 
5 Conclusion
53  The purpose of my essay was to consider whether there is a fundamental distinction
between normative conflicts that involve general cases and instantiation conflicts. Jorge
Rodríguez,  Riccardo Guastini,  Pablo Navarro and others discussed this  problem: their
conclusion is that the distinction exists. Our conclusion was precisely the opposite: every
antinomy can be reduced to a clash between contradictory regulations of generic cases.
Therefore, NS was then right in assuming this position. In order to reach this conclusion,
we  examined  three  examples  of  instantiation  conflicts.  Following  Ratti’s  proof,  we
observed that, if we apply antecedent strengthening, these conflicts could be transformed
into antinomies that can be detected without taking into considerations the peculiarities
of individual cases. We proceeded to discuss the idea of a conceptual connection between
the contents of two norms, and we found that this connection depends on what Carnap
used to call “meaning postulates”, which we have analyzed as a kind of partial definition
that tends to completeness. Once considered that meaning-postulates establish a purely
inferential relations between the contents of two terms, by specifying the scope of their
respective extensions, we concluded that we have another good reason to get rid of the
distinction  between  conflicts  between  generic  cases  and  instantiation  conflicts.  This
argument is  quite novel:  among the participants to this  debate,  Ratti  alone has seen
through  this  muddle  and  offered  a  counter  argument  to  the  case  for  instantiation
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conflict. In the last paragraph, we suggested to displace the whole problem from logics to
cognition: the examples proposed by the instantiation conflicts enthusiasts are precisely
antinomies between generic cases that are cognitively costly to discover. 
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NOTES
1. I am grateful to an anonymous referee of this journal for the following clarification: the logical
derivation of individual requirements from general norms does not involve any volitional act. And
it  seems  even  dubious  that  the  act  of  inference presupposes  any  volitional  act.  By  contrast,
individual decisions, even when grounded on general norms, do involve a volitional act.
2. Alchourrón and Bulygin 1971: 49. The present investigation shall be limited to the analysis of
normative conflicts proposed in Normative Systems. Therefore, I will not explore the successive
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developments of Alchourron and Bulygin’s ideas, which the reader may find in various chapters
of Alchourrón and Bulygin 1991 and in Bulygin 2015. 
3. On the concept of empowerment see Paulson (1988; 1998: xlix; 2013). On the use of this concept
made by Alchourrón and Bulygin, have a look at Calzetta (2016). 
4. See Paulson 1998: xi; 2000; 2012 and Grabowski 2013 for a discussion on the relations between
positivism, validity and membership. 
5. Alchourrón and Bulygin 1971: ch. 1–3; Appendix.
6. Hilpinen 2015: 23 ff.
7. Although someone might have the impression that Alchourrón and Bulygin were not entirely
aware, at that time, of the problem related to the distinction between “insular” and “bridge”
models of deontic conditionals. 
8. Alchourrón and Bulygin 1971: ch. 4. See also Barberis 1997: 33 ff.
9. Alchourrón and Bulygin 1971: ch. 4 § 7. See also Mazzarese 1991. 
10. See also Barberis 2016 and 2017 for a discussion over the limitation of a traditional positivist
account, and the advantages of a truly realistic account of law. 
11. In the present essay, I will use “antinomies” and “normative conflicts” as synonyms. On the
notion of antinomy see Barberis 2008: 158 ff. and Mazzarese 1984 and 1987. On the distinction
between non-antinomy and non-contradiction see Muffato 2010. 
12. Alchourrón and Bulygin 1971: ch. 7.
13. Actually, the conceptual connection requirement plays a key-role for the reduction
strategy, insofar as it settles a semantic, abstract link between the antecedents of two
apparently unrelated. 
14. Kahneman 2013. 
15. Alchourrón and Bulygin 1971: ch. 4, § 6.
16. This consideration is very important for a deep understanding of the difference between
internal and external negation of a norm. This problem was analyzed by Ross 1968; Caracciolo
1994; Ratti 2013: 95 ff. 
17. Rodríguez 1995: 364 ff. deals with this problem. 
18. Alchourrón and Bulygin 1971: Appendix: (D20) ‘Coh (UCi, USmax) [ = Coh (UPi, UAj)] = {( α| UCi ⇒
USmaxj) ∈ Fun}, where ‘Coh’ stands for ‘Coherence’, ‘UC’ for Universe of cases, ‘UP’ universe of
properties, ‘USmax’ for Universe of maximal solutions, ‘UA’ universe of actions. The symbol ‘{ α|
… }’ represents the set of entities that satisfy condition and, finally, ‘Fun’ stands for the set of
functions. 
19. The same consideration holds for analysis of two related topics: normative relevance and
axiological relevance.
20. Von Wright 1963: 148.
21. Quine 1966: 5.
22. There are several ways out: one is the rejection of ex falso quodlibet; the rejection of bivalence
is another. See Moreso, Navarro and Redondo 2003: 127 ff.
23. To be sure, Alchourrón and Bulygin 1989: 673 ff. deals with this issue. On this point see also
Navarro and Rodríguez 2014: 176. 
24. Guastini 2011: 105 ff.
25. Even  though  Alchourrón  and  Bulygin  maintain  that  a  new  interpretation  determines  a
change of the normative system. 
26. On the importance of individual case in the hermeneutic tradition see Carlizzi 2011.
27. Strawson 1969: 226 ff.; Lowe 1995: 512.
28. Quine 1947.
29. Lewis 1983: 344.
30. Armstrong 1997.
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31. Lewis 1983: 344.
32. Ramsey 1925: 401 ff.
33. Lowe 1995: 518.
34. Russell 1948: Part IV, ch. 8.
35. Von Wright 1963: ch. III postulates an analogous distinction, although expressing in terms of
individual/general actions (instead of cases). 
36. Guastini 2011: 205 ss.
37. Rodríguez 2002.
38. I prefer to use “normative sentence-type” rather than “normative formulation” because the
latter denotes a broader notion, which includes: normative sentence-types, normative sentence-
tokens, normative utterance-types and normative utterance-tokens. The distinction is salient for
the present discussion:  as I  will  suggest  later,  the fact  that a normative conflict  comes from
normative types, and not tokens, offers a good reason to think that it involves general cases. 
39. Navarro and Rodríguez 2014: 179.
40. Rodríguez 1995: 372; 2002.
41. Rodríguez 2002; Navarro and Rodríguez 2014.
42. Navarro and Rodríguez 2014: 179.
43. Navarro and Rodríguez 2014: 183.
44. Guastini 2011: 106 ff.
45. Rodríguez 1995: 372.
46. Guastini 2011: 106 ff.
47. Guastini 2015: 45 ff.
48. Navarro and Rodríguez 2014: 179.
49. Navarro and Rodríguez 2014: 183.
50. Jackendoff 1985: 77. Categorization is a logical operation that brings a first-order logic atomic
sentence  (the  token)  under  the  scope  of  a  complex  ontological  category  (the  type)  by  a
predicative sentence of the form ‘a is φ’ (for instance: ‘Il Lamborghini is a Tractor’) or, if you
prefer a set-theoretic approach, by a two-place relational function ‘a ∈ T’ (Jackendoff 1985: 78
ff.).
51. Marconi 1997: 64.
52. Rodríguez 1995: 371 ff.
53. We can thus consider that generic cases fulfill in NS one of the functions that, in Kelsen’s
positivistic theory, can be ascribed to the Grundnorm: namely, granting “unity” to the system. I
take  this  interpretation  of  Kelsen’s  work,  and  the  whole  idea  of  functions,  from  Stanley  L.
Paulson’s most up-do-date reading of the Basic Norm. See, at least, Paulson 2012. 
54. Ratti 2013: 98.
55. Stalnaker 1984: 123–4.
56. Ratti 2013: 98. This argument does not apply to the ten-dollars-credit-case.
57. Ross 1959 would call this a partial/partial conflict, for it is an antinomy between partially
overlapping cases. 
58. Ratti 2013: 99.
59. Ratti 2013: 99.
60. Hamner Hill 1987: 226.
61. Hamner Hill 1987: 228.
62. Carnap 1952 and Carnap 1959: 63 ff.
63. It’s worth stressing that meaning postulates depend on a somewhat arbitrary choice of the
semanticist:  therefore,  it  is  well  possible  that  different  persons  assign  different  meaning
postulates to a phrase or word. In a similar way, different legal interpreters can assign different
meaning  postulates  to  the  same  lexical  item.  Moreover  they  can  vary,  and  they  are  always
context-dependent.
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64. Katz 1972; Clark 1973; Burazin 2016.
65. In this case, the antinomy is total/partial,  for unicorns are included in the class of meek
animals.
66. Here,  we  are  using  second-order  predication:  we  predicate  something  of  a  concept  (the
concept of tractor) rather than an object (Il Lamborghini). See Kremer 1985.
67. Armstrong 1978; Lewis 1983.
68. In this paper, for simplicity, I will not introduce also causal predicates in our picture. On the
logical structure of causal predicates see Davidson 1967a and 1967b.
69. Frege 1979: 126.
70. On the limits of this approach see Marconi (1997: 107, 10): “What we feel would be needed in
the case of such word as ‘walk’ or ‘painting’, ‘sepia’ or ‘inducement’ is close to a truth function in
being an explicit instruction for the use of a word. This is what Tarskian semantics (or Montague
semantics, for that matter) does not provide us with, for such instructions would be different for
non-synonymous words, whereas whatever information we get from Tarskian semantics is the
same for ‘table’, ‘book’, and ‘walk’ […].”
71. Marconi 1997: 114.
72. Ross 1959: ch. 4.
73. Of course, this does not apply to the ten-dollars-credit case. 
74. As an anonymous referee suggested, it is worth stressing that, in the lexicon of NS, there is a
technical device to deal with such cases: the analysis of the relations between finer and less fine
universes of cases.
75. Intensions  are  functions  from  indices  (for  instance,  possible  worlds)  to  extensions (i.e.
functions  that  assign  to  each  possible  world  a  set  of  individuals).  See  Carnap  1956:  181.
Eventually,  during  this  process,  the  interpreter  might  extend  and  restrict  the  domain  of
quantifications over properties, in order to create or prevent normative conflicts. 
76. Peacocke 1992: ch. 3.
77. Longo and Barrett 2010: 66.
78. I am grateful to Lidia Fanfoni and Paolo Cinquegrana for these examples. 
ABSTRACTS
The author proposes new arguments in favor of Alchourrón and Bulygin’s theory presented in
Normative Systems (1971), by showing how even paradigmatic examples of instantiation conflicts
can be  reframed as  antinomies  between general  cases.  He  proceeds  as  follows.  After  a  brief
reconstruction of Alchourrón and Bulygin’s analysis of normative conflicts, he introduces the
notion  of  instantiation  conflict  and  shows  how  authors  such  as  Riccardo  Guastini, Jorge
Rodríguez,  Pablo Navarro and others rely on that notion for pointing out the existence of  a
“special” category of normative conflicts, which are necessarily bound to individual, actual cases
and, therefore, fall out of the scope of Alchourrón and Bulygin’s analysis. The author maintains
that, should they be right, several fundamental assumptions of Alchourrón and Bulygin’s theory
might be seriously questioned. Against this background he argues that a reductionist approach is
feasible  and closes  the paper  by trying to  save one of  the main intuitions  that  inspired the
instantiation conflicts argument.
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